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This article begins by discussing the genesis of a free zone on a small island in the Straits
archipelagos, tracing its development from a free port to an export processing zone and most re-
cently to a science park. Throughout its life as a free zone, this island has comprised a transnational
commercial domain of a dual legal order. A dual legal order comprises two domains, a transjuris-
dictional commercial and local political. Here we focus on a particular type of transjurisdictional
commercial domain–the free zone. Three historical forms of zone receive attention, the free port,
export processing zone and the science park. Various manifestations geographically and tempo-
rally are elaborated. In conclusion, a number of observations are then made concerning dual legal
orders and free zones.
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A. Introduction 
In 1786, the British East India Company landed on a small island in the Straits archipelagos.  
Although the Company encountered inhabitants, the island was deemed terra nullius, declared 
property of the Crown and named Prince William Island.  Over time, the island was established 
as a free port and renamed Penang.  Located along the colonial trade routes, Penang offered 
merchant shippers exemption from tariff duties when they stopped on the island to load, unload 
or trade goods.  With de-colonisation, the island lost its British-legislated free port status.  At 
independence, the newly-formed Malaysian government took control over Penang and 
transformed the island into an export processing zone (EPZ) and, more recently, it has been 
reborn once again as 'Silicon Island'. 
Post-independence Penang has defined itself as a haven for offshore manufacturing.  The 
government provides factories tailored to the needs of a range of industries, including 
agriculture, automobile, chemical and fertiliser, metal, paper and printing, pharmaceutical, 
resource-based, textile and garment and wood processing.  Since the late 1960s, high technology 
companies have increasingly located low-end production processes in Penang.  More recently, 
while maintaining its diverse industrial base, Penang has sought to transform itself from a 
provider of factory labour to a producer of sophisticated high technology goods.   
In 1969 the government established the Penang Development Corporation to cater to 
foreign companies.   The Corporation works closely with foreign companies to identify their 
needs and, once companies locate operations on the island, to keep them satisfied.  To deliver on 
its promises, the federal government granted the Corporation the power to legislate.  The 
Corporation is also closely intermingled with the state government.  For instance, Corporation 
Chairman, Koh Tsu Koon, serves as the Chief Minister of Penang.i1 
The government provides a range of options to companies wishing to locate offshore 
operations in Penang.  The industrial infrastructure of the island includes free industrial zones, 
industrial parks and licensed manufacturing warehouses.  A free industrial zone is a 
geographically delimited territory catering to export-oriented businesses.  Geographically more 
limited industrial parks gear themselves to joint venture projects and to local companies 
contracted by transnational corporations (TNCs) to provide support services.  Licensed 
manufacturing warehouses are essentially factories that may be located outside of the zones and 
parks and also provide special privileges to foreign and domestic industries.ii2 
Throughout its post-independence incarnations, Penang has presented itself as a respite 
for foreign companies plagued by inefficient and burdensome home state regulation.  While 
Penang puts forth an image of a government-free zone, in reality, the government is proactively 
involved in serving the needs of companies.  The government employs the Development 
Corporation to cater to foreign companies, using a range of public and private law means.  For 
instance, the Corporation established academic and vocational institutions such as the Penang 
Skills Development Center 'to provide custom-made workers for industries.'iii3  Also, the 
Corporation has transformed itself into an 'integrated manufacturing center', offering foreign 
                                                
1 J Chin and LM Keong 'Silicon Island' [9/1999] Asia Inc Malaysian Edn 17.  As with many of the high technology 
government leaders in Malaysia, Koh was educated in the United States. 
2 Asia Inc 'Silicon Island' [9/1999] Asia Inc Malaysian Edition and Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
Malaysia: Investment in the Manufacturing Sector: Policies, Incentives and Facilities (MIDA Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia) 61 
3  J Chin & CY Heong 'Cyber Czar: Othman Yeop Abdullah’s vision for Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor' 
(1999) 8(8) Asia Inc 16, 18 
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companies several links of their production process in one package.  So Penang provides not 
only ready-made factories and cheap offshore labour, but also research and development, design 
and tooling, financial planning, infrastructure and also sales and marketing.iv4 
Penang is so integrated into the transnational high technology economy that even during 
the recent currency crisis, investment into the island grew by an estimate two-point-one billion 
dollars.  This influx came from leading high technology TNCs such as Advanced Micro 
Services, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Toray, Motorola, Osram Opto and Seagate.v5  By catering 
extensively to foreign companies, Penang has established itself as a transnational commercial 
domain of Malaysia's dual legal order.  Laws and policies are directed at promoting commercial 
interests.   
This island in the Straits archipelagos has been a free zone for several centuries.  During 
colonial times, it was an extra-territorial settlement, a free port, controlled by the British.  After 
independence, it became a transnational commercial domain, an EPZ and then a science park, 
within the political territory of Malaysia.  Throughout its life as a free zone, a different 
regulatory regime existed on the island than in other parts of proto-Malaysia and subsequently 
Malaysia.  While certain domains of proto-Malaysia and Malaysia were geared towards internal 
domestic matters, the island was transnational in its outlook.  Thus, two regulatory domains, a 
local political and transnational commercial, existed within the political territory of what is now 
Malaysia.   
The coexistence of two regulatory domains within a unitary sovereign territory is referred 
to here as dual legal order.  Dual legal orders have existed at various historical points and in 
numerous places.  This chapter will first introduce the dual legal order concept, elaborating its 
contours and providing various examples.  Then, we will discuss a particular type of 
transnational commercial domain--the free zones—of dual legal orders.  Here, the evolution of 
these zones will be traced as they transform from free ports or free cities into EPZs and finally 
into science parks.  In conclusion, we will summarise the argument briefly and then make a 
number of observations. 
B. Dual Legal Orders 
1. The Concept 
A dual legal order comprises two domains, transjurisdictional commercial and local political.  
Typically each domain is defined by source and subject matter based criteria.  The 
transjurisdictional domain is defined by composite, foreign and local, inputs and legal processes 
serving the interests of transjurisdictional commerce.  The local political domain is defined by its 
primarily domestic inputs and legal processes governing internal cultural, economic and political 
matters.  The division between the two domains is highly negotiated.  When contest arises, a 
legal negotiation ensues between the two domains.  Through this negotiation, a contested matter 
either becomes a matter affecting commerce or a local political matter.  Although the Penang 
example provides an example of a territorially defined transjurisdictional domain, domains need 
not be territorially delimited. 
Dual legal orders may take myriad forms, varying according to time and place.  While a 
common template exists, dual legal orders exhibit a range of types, including, colonial, federalist, 
                                                
4 Id 17-19 
5 Id 18 
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inter-state and supra-national.  The two domains may be formally set forth in constitutional 
documentation or, instead, informally adapted through legislation and contract.  The division 
between the transjurisdictional commercial and local political domains is negotiated and time 
and place contingent.  Given the large number of dual legal orders, this section briefly explores 
several types and introduces the negotiated nature of the inter-domain division. 
2. Variable Types 
From colonial to present day transnational legal orders, dual legal orders have varied in form.vi6  
For instance, Dutch colonial policy was premised upon extending sovereignty only to matters 
affecting its own overseas citizens and their commercial life.  According to this policy, to the 
extent that colonial commerce was unaffected, colonised populations were left free to govern 
their own lives.vii7  A very different type of dual legal order came into being when a group of 
African countries established The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, a customs 
union devoted to regional commercial integration.viii8  However, just as the Dutch colonial policy 
distinguished between transjurisdictional commercial and local political matters, the Common 
Market adopts a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.   
The following sub-sections discuss colonial, federalist, supra-national, inter-state and 
informal dual legal orders.  The concept of ‘dual legal system’ was first introduced in the 
academic literature in relation to colonial orders.ix9  Colonial administrators have also employed 
the concept. 
a. Colonial Dual Legal Orders 
In The Dual Mandate, Sir F. D. Lugardx10 argued that 'Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit 
of her own industrial classes and the native races in their progress to a higher plane.'xi11  At the 
                                                
6 For an application of the dual legal system concept to modern Indonesia see DM Trubek, Y Dezalay, R Buchanan 
and JR Davis 'Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies in the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation 
of Transnational Arenas' (1994) 44 Case Western Reserve Law Review 407 
7 Colonial dual legal systems drew a sharp distinction between the transjurisdictional commercial domain and the 
local political domain.  The customary laws of local populations were to be left alone.  When customary laws 
violated standards of civilisation, chartered companies or colonial governments were permitted to deem such laws 
‘void for repugnancy’.  While officially customary law represented an off-limits domain, in practice, customary law 
itself was, in Sally Falk Moore’s terms, a ‘composite construction’ (SF Moore Social Facts and Fabrications: 
“Customary” Law on Kilimanjaro 1880-1980 [Cambridge UP Cambridge 1986] 5), the product of a negotiation 
among companies, government, and local populations. 
To pursue their commercial mandate, the companies sometimes commissioned studies of local customary 
laws.  Compilations were then used for the purposes of administration.  For this reason, the articulation of customary 
law by company agents was designed as a mechanism for effectuating change.  According to Francis G. Snyder, 
customary law itself ‘belonged to an ideology that generally accompanied and formed part of colonial domination.’  
(FG Snyder ‘Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of “Customary Law” in Senegal’ [1981] J Legal Pluralism 
49).  While local customary law was supposed to remain intact in British overseas not only was this customary law 
collaboratively produced by foreign and local actors, but also, its abridgement was permitted in cases in which such 
customs conflicted with the principles of civilisation. 
8 See e.g. PK Kiplagat 'Legal Status of Integration Treaties and the Enforcement of Treaty Obligations: A Look at 
the COMESA Process' (1995) 23 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 259 
9 See eg JS Furnivall Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and 
Netherlands India (1956). 
10 He would later be Lord Lugard. 
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time, Lugard was British High Commissioner, Governor and Governor-General of Northern 
Nigeria.  He would later be appointed a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission 
established by the United Nations to oversee decolonisation.  The pursuit of these dual goals, 
according to Lugard, was best carried out through a dual order, leaving local populations 'free to 
manage their own affairs through their own rulers,' while intervening only to 'preserve law and 
order, to develop trade and communications in the country, and to protect the interests of the 
merchants and others who are engaged in the development of its commercial and mineral 
resources.'xii12  Realising the policy might breed resentment and lead to unrest among host 
societies, he advocated adapting the policy to specific circumstances of countries in which 
business was undertaken.  Thus, he argues, '[p]rinciples do not change, but their mode of 
application may and should vary with the customs, the traditions, and the prejudices of each 
unit.'xiii13 
The most fundamental division in colonial legal orders existed between the legal aspects 
of transnational commerce and matters affecting it, on the one hand, and of local customs, on the 
other.  In practice dual legal orders were highly pragmatic, dependent upon the nature of 
commercial engagement and peculiarities of local cultures.  Colonisers aimed to sustain 
commercial enterprise by fostering relationships with domestic elites of overseas territories.  
Maintenance of relationships required acquiescence of local populations.  Colonisers instituted 
'cooperation' through a mix of force, incentives (commercial and political) and opinion.  Often 
merchants lacked the requisite military might and political will to subdue forcibly local political 
communities.  Thus, control was achieved through processes of bargaining, negotiation and 
imposition.xiv14 
Colonial dual orders were pragmatic and commercially-oriented.  Commercial interests 
were often pursued through preexisting political structures.  Most colonial powers realised that 
allowing local laws to remain partially in place solved practical problems.  According to official 
policy, laws affecting commercial interests, criminal law, commercial law and labour law, were 
replaced while laws governing domestic relations, inheritance and family law, left intact.xv15  
Fiscal and military concerns also drove colonial pragmatism.  Colonial expansion required force, 
which was an expensive and scarce resource.  The Crown did not always provide sufficient 
military backing to chartered companies.  Also, while often colonisers possessed naval powers 
superior to overseas polities, colonial military strength on land typically was inferior.xvi16 
According to official pronouncements, extension of jurisdiction was highly discretionary 
and generally extended only as commercial exigencies required.  Otherwise, the colonial power 
left indigenous societies free to manage their own lives according to their own laws.  The 
coloniser nonetheless reinforced powers of chosen local leaders as arbitrators of customary 
                                                                                                                                                            
11 FD Lugard The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (William Blackwood and Sons London 1922) 
12 Id 
13 Id.  Variation was so extensive that Hall notes, '[t]he powers exercised by Great Britain in the protectorates are 
singularly various in both form and extent.  WE Hall A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the 
British Crown (Clarendon P Oxford 1894) 210 
14 R Gilbert The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigner (J. Murray London 1929) 
15 TO Elias 'Colonial Courts and the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent' (1955) 18 The Modern L Rev 356 and MB 
Hooker Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Clarendon P Oxford 1975); and ------
- A Concise History of South-East Asia (Clarendon P Oxford 1978) 
16 WH-J Leue 'Legal Expansion in the Age of Companies: Aspects of the Administration of Justice in the English 
and Dutch Settlements of Maritime Asia, c. 1600-1750' in WJ Mommsen and JA De Moor, (edd), European 
Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia
(Berg Oxford 1992) 129, 137-139 
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law.xvii17  At times the colonising agent abrogated customary laws in the name of civilisation.  T. 
O. Elias notes: 'There is the indigenous system of traditional courts applying mainly customary 
law or such part of it as is not considered to be repugnant to the principles of 'natural justice, 
equity and good conscience' or inconsistent with any validly applicable law in the colony.'xviii18  
Customary laws varied according to time and place throughout the overseas territories.xix19 
The representations of colonial dual legal orders suggest that customary laws, the rules of 
the local political domain, were determined entirely by local political societies.  However, since 
the 1980s scholars have increasingly questioned this assumption.20  For instance, Sally Falk 
Moore has termed customary laws 'composite colonial constructions' in which 'current 
social/cultural systems like souped-up automobiles are constructions made out of new and used 
parts.'21  Similarly, Martin Chanock notes, 'both foreign and indigenous laws are products of the 
colonial situation, continually being formed in response to new historical circumstances.'  He 
explains: 
This model considers the legal system as one in which the colonial law, itself a 
specific creation rather than an import, and the new state and economy 
continually refashion African custom from the materials proffered by the 
colonized societies.  In this perspective both foreign and indigenous laws are 
products of the colonial situation, continually being formed in response to new 
historical circumstances.22 
Francis Snyder explains the making of customary law as follows: 'Though "customary law" 
implies historical continuity, its origins are actually relatively recent.  The notion of customary 
law in Africa and elsewhere was specific to particular historical circumstances.  It belonged to an 
ideology that generally accompanied and formed part of colonial domination.'23  The creation of 
customary law, according to Snyder, was subsidiary to commercial concerns: 'Both the concrete 
forms and its conceptualization resulted from changes in social relations associated with the 
transformation of precapitalist modes of production and the sub-sumption of precapitalist social 
                                                
17 WH-J Leue 'Legal Expansion in the Age of Companies: Aspects of the Administration of Justice in the English 
and Dutch Settlements of Maritime Asia, c. 1600-1750' in WJ Mommsen and JA De Moor, (edd), European 
Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia
(Berg Oxford 1992) 129, 142 
18 JDM Derrett 'Justice, Equality and Good Conscience' in Sir JND Anderson Changing Law in Developing 
Countries (Allen and Unwin London 1963) 114-115; TO Elias 'Colonial Courts and the Doctrine of Judicial 
Precedent' (1955) 18 The Modern L Rev 356, 358 and ------- 'Notes: Form and Contents of Colonial Law' (1954) 3 
Intl and Comparative LQ 645, 647 
19 See e.g. MB Hooker Legal Pluralism (OUP Oxford 1975); and RD Kollewign 'Conflicts of Western and Non-
Western Law' (1951) 4 The Intl LQ 307 
20 SE Merry 'Law and Colonialism' (1991) 25(4) L and Society Rev 889, 897-906, ------- 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 
22(5) L and Society Rev 869 & SF Moore 'Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-
1999' (on file with author) 
21 SF Moore Social Facts and Fabrications "Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro 1880-1980 (Cambridge UP 
Cambridge 1986) 5, 10 
22 M Chanock 'The Law Market: British East and Central Africa' in WJ Mommsen and J de Moor, (edd), European 
Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia
(Berg Oxford 1992) 279, 280.  See also ML Chanock Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in 
Malawi and Zambia  (Cambridge UP Cambridge 1985) 
23 FG Snyder 'Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of "Customary Law" in Senegal' (1981), 19 J Legal 
Pluralism 49 
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formation with the capitalist economy.'24  Thus, what was assumed local was often the product of 
a collaborative effort between certain foreign and local interests.   
At the same time, the mix of foreign and local inputs into local law varied tremendously 
according to time and place.  Also, the colonial power did not absolutely dominate local political 
socieites.  So, even when the overseas power did not recognise the existence of a local political 
domain, it could exist nonetheless in fact. 
Creation of commerce facilitating laws required an alteration or re-creation of local 
customary law.  Intervention occurred explicitly in some cases and more subtly in others.  For 
instance, colonial authorities regularly remodeled customary laws regarding labour relations and 
land-holding.25  Local laws not re-fashioned were formally termed customary laws.  Matters 
customary and non-customary alike regularly were remodeled transjurisdictionally. 
While local customary laws formally remained intact in British overseas colonies, not only 
were customary laws collaboratively produced by foreign and local actors, but abridgement was 
permitted in cases in which customs conflicted with the principles of civilisation.26  For example, 
while the introduction of British law into the Straits Settlements was subject to local customs, 
when customary law operated 'unjustly or oppressively' it was derogated.27  Further, often the 
civilising mission was subsidiary to commercial interests.  Lugard notes: 
Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not 
been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of 
pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual befit of her own industrial 
classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be 
made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilized administration to fulfil this 
dual mandate. 
By railways and roads, by reclamation of swamps and irrigation of deserts, and by a 
system of fair trade and competition, we have added to the prosperity and wealth of these 
lands.  We have put an end to the awful misery of these lands, and checked famine and 
disease.  We have put an end to the awful misery of the slave-trade and inter-tribal war, 
to human sacrifice and the ordeals of the witch-doctor.  Where these things survive they 
are severely suppressed.  We are endeavouring to teach the native races to conduct their 
own affairs with justice and humanity, and to educate them alike in letters and in 
industry.28 
The tension between the civilising mission and respect for local sovereign autonomy must be 
understood within this broader context of transborder commercial predominance and also a 
                                                
24 Id 
25 WJ Mommsen 'Introduction' in WJ Mommsen and J de Moor, (edd), European Expansion and Law: The 
Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia (Berg Oxford 1992) 1, 9 
26 Derrett; D Engels 'Wives, Widows, and Workers: Women and the Law in Colonial India' in WJ Mommsen and J 
de Moor, (edd), European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-
Century Africa and Asia (Berg Oxford 1992) 159-178 and J Fisch 'Law as a Means and as an End: Some Remarks 
on the Function of European and Non-European Law in the Process of European Expansion' in WJ Mommsen and J 
de Moor, (edd), European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-
Century Africa and Asia (Berg Oxford 1992) 15 
27 PP Buss-Tjen 'Malay Law' (1958) 7 AJCL 248, 255-256 
28 FD Lugard The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (William Blackwood and Sons London 1922) 617 
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customary law which was a composite colonial construction.  While the commercial context was 
often acknowledged in official documents, this was rarely the case with regard to the composite 
nature of customary law. 
As has been demonstrated, colonial dual legal orders varied tremendously according to 
time and place.  Whle in the academic literature the term ‘dual legal system’ is generally 
reserved for colonial orders, the concept of dual legal order put forth here includes federalist, 
supra-national, inter-state and informal order within its ambit. 
b. Federalist, Supra-national, Inter-state and Informal Dual Legal Orders 
Federalist legal orders are typically dual legal orders in design.  At initiation, constituent political 
jurisdictions associate with one another to develop rules for managing their transjurisdictional 
commercial affairs.  At the same time, parties are keen to maintain sovereign control over their 
internal political affairs.  For instance, the US first established itself on this basis.  There federal 
jurisdiction derived from the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution. 
Nation-states may also establish dual legal orders by creating institutions devoted to 
managing transnational commercial relations.  For instance, throughout the post-Second World 
War period, oligarchic states have created common institutions to promote and manage 
transnational commercial integration.  The relationship between states and the nascent 
institutions has accorded with the dual legal order design.  Following the War, countries gathered 
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to establish the International Monetary Fund, International 
Trade Organisation and World Bank, to manage the world economy.29  The role of the 
international institutions was limited to the transnational commercial domain, as the Articles of 
Incorporation of the World Bank indicate: 'The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member.'30 
Supra-national institutions such as the European Union also owe their existence to a 
commercial integration movement.  Originally, the European Economic Community was charged 
with creating the transjurisdictional sphere of a 'Europe', leaving domestic matters to the 
constituent member states.  The reach of the Economic Community extended with the Single 
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty.  Member state laws were to be rearranged only to the 
extent necessary to facilitate inter-state commerce.  Accordingly, the Europe Without Borders
initiative was envisioned as identifying those national regulations affecting commerce and to 
redesign them so as to mature the transnational commercial domain, establishing free movement 
of capital, companies, goods and workers. 
Each of these dual legal orders has been organised through constitution drafting.  
However, dual legal order may also emerge informally.  For instance, in Malaysia, the 
government in 1994 embarked upon the Multimedia Super Corridor, a high technology national 
development plan and foreign direct investment scheme.  This Corridor would be located on a 
fifteen by forty kilometre strip of land.  The Corridor itself is a part of the transnatonal 
commercial domain of Malaysia’s dual legal order.31  The Corridor has not been 
constitutionalised, although, functionally two legal domains coexist within the country's 
                                                
29 The International Trade Organisation never materialised. 
30 Articles of Incorporation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 12/27/1945, Art. I @10 
31 For a discussion of Malaysia's formal federalist system see e.g. A Ibrahim 'Malaysia as a Federation' (1974) 1(1) J 
Malaysian and Comparative L 1 and LA Sheridan and HE Groves The Constitution of Malaysia (4th edn Malaysian 
Law Journal Singapore 1987) 
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sovereign territory.  Establishing an extra-constitutional dual legal order requires the 
oligarchising of the state. 
While in theory and according to the constitution, Malaysian citizens are to determine the 
legislative composition of the country, in certain legal realms, foreign actors and government 
officials have cartelised power over legal decision-making.  This transnational community has 
successfully coordinated and commandeered aspects of the Malaysian legal order in a manner 
that subverts their intended purpose.  In doing so, they have established an informal dual legal 
order, through contract, legislation and executive action.  The legal authority of the government 
to enter into agreements and the privilege of foreign actors to participate in the Corridor derive 
from the sovereignty of the Malaysian people.  However, while the citizenry are vested with the 
right to legitimise activities occurring within the Corridor, in practice, they are structurally 
excluded from decision-making processes. 
Not only are the forms of dual legal orders manifold, but also a single form may vary 
tremendously depending upon time and place. 
2. Transitions in Time 
As the Penang example illustrates, dual legal orders come into being at historical moments and 
develop over time.  When Prince William Island was first 'discovered', overseas settlers declared 
the territory terra nullius.  Since preexisting inhabitants of the island were not recognised in law, 
at the time, no formal dual legal order was created.  From the perspective of indigenous societies, 
usurpation of control over the island represented an attempt to displace the preexisting order.  To 
the extent that the Company was unsuccessful in monopolising legal power, a dual legal order 
existed in fact on the island.  This sub-section examines how dual legal orders change over time 
and how participants in the transnational commercial domain insure against uncontrolled effects 
of the local political domain on their undertakings. 
While the dual legal order formally assumes a sharp, static and impregnable division 
between domains, the classificatory task of placing a specific matter in either of the domains is 
fraught with difficulty and often the subject of controversy.  The correct classification of a 
particular matter will vary according to time, place and circumstance.  As the discussion 
concerning the origins of dual legal orders demonstrates, province and extent of domains are 
correlative.  As one domain expands, the other domain contracts.  Also, shifts are rarely tidy and 
typically the subject of political contest. 
A piece of property belonging to the transnational commercial domain may transform 
into local political property through the action of an insurgent local political community.  For 
instance, in the wake of national independence movements, whether new states could politicise 
foreign commercial property was the subject of international debate.  If politicisation proceeded, 
transnational commercial property would become local political property.  Through its 1962 
General Assembly Resolution, entitled Permanent Sovereignty over National Resources, the 
United Nations resolved the issue: 'Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based 
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or national interest which are recognized as 
overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.'32  Thus, Resolution 
                                                
32 'Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources', GA Res. 1803 (XVII), UN 
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17 
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1803 urged that in a case of controversy, the domestic political domain would trump the 
transjurisdictional commercial. 
The International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Facility provides a counter 
example, whereby a local political matter becomes a transnational commercial one.  Through this 
Facility, the Fund 'ties its loans to stabilization programs that ensure the country's financial and 
political institutions are attuned to the Fund's ideal of sound economic management.'33  By tying 
international financial aid to reform of the local political domain, the Fund transforms domestic 
matters into matters affecting transnational commerce.  The Facility is employed typically in 
times of financial crisis during which control over the local political domain is vulnerable.  Thus, 
through a process of legal negotiation, a contested matter either becomes a matter affecting 
commerce or a domestic political matter.  Importantly, the bargains struck are not only 
strategically orchestrated, but also vary according to time and place. 
For example, take the state of New York in post-independence America after the signing 
of the federal constitution, but prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  At that point, New 
York enjoyed sovereignty over its internal affairs.  However, sovereignty was not absolute and, 
according to the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution, inter-state commerce fell under 
federal jurisdiction.  Article 1, Section 8 provides Congress with the right '[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes.'34  
Taking an expansive reading of matters falling under the Commerce Clause, transjurisdictional 
commercial matters occurring in New York were governed by federal law rather than New York 
state law.  Thus, two discernible legal domains coexisted within the territory of New York.  
These domains were not territorially determined, but instead subject matter based.  Additionally, 
while the legislative source of the transjurisdictional domain, the federal government, included 
both citizens of New York and foreigners, the local political domain was composed only of New 
Yorkers. 
The border between the two domains in the New York example was negotiated and 
varied over time.  Under an expansive reading of the commerce clause, the province of the local 
political domain was significantly curtailed as matters affecting the flow of inter-state commerce 
fell under federal jurisdiction.  On the other hand, a conservatively interpreted Commerce Clause 
meant that matters must be more directly within the stream of transjurisdictional commerce to be 
governed by Congress.  Readings of the Commerce Clause's reach have shifted with time.  
Generally as the federal government has grown in size, the reach of the Commerce Clause has 
also expanded. 
In the US context, one question that would inevitably arise as the federal government 
took on increasing power was, in the case in which interstate and intrastate commerce overlap, 
which domain should be supreme.35  Throughout the nineteenth century, a system of dual 
federalism reigned in which the federal and state governments as equals vied for supremacy.  
According to Edward S. Corwin, 'dual federalism' comprises four postulates: 'The national 
government is one of enumerated powers only; Also, the purposes which it may constitutionally 
promote are few; Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are 'sovereign' 
                                                
33 S Anthony 'IMF Structural Adjustment Programs: An Econometric Evaluation' (1998) 3 The Georgetown P Policy 
Rev 133, 135 
34 US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 
35 Edward S. Corwin asks: 'By what rules are collisions between the respective powers of the two centers of 
government supposed by the Constitution to be determined.'  ES Corwin 'The Passing of Dual Federalism' (1950) 36 
Virginia L Rev 1, 13 
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and hence 'equal'; The relation of the two centers with each other is one of tension rather than 
collaboration.36  Similarly, the Commerce Clause recognised the sovereignty of foreign nations 
and the 'Indian tribes' as external to and independent of the federal government.  The laws of 
'Indian tribes' were thus generated by norms exterior to the US legal system.  Thus, when a US 
court resolved a dispute by reference to the laws of 'Indian tribes' it looked outside its own legal 
system to ascertain the appropriate rule to guide decision-making. 
In contrast, according to Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia, 'no dual legal 
system of law' exists in that country.37  Whilst the Court acknowledged that indigenous societies 
may possess their own laws, it did not recognise these laws for the purposes of its own decision-
making.  Instead, Kirby relates, '[f]or Aboriginal legal rights, including native title, to be 
enforceable in an Australian court, a foundation must be found within the Australian legal 
system.'38  Thus, although Australian legislation 'may protect and reinforce some aspects of 
traditional laws and customs', this fact was merely incidental.  Instead, '[t]he source of the 
enforceability of native title in this or any other Australian court is, and is only, as an applicable 
[Australian] law or statute provides.'39 
In the US context in the 1914 Shreveport Rate Cases the Supreme Court asserted that in a 
case of inter-domain controversy, the transjurisdictional domain would trump: 'Wherever the 
interstate and intrastate transaction of carriers are so related that the government of one involves 
the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and 
dominant rule; otherwise the Nation would not be supreme within the National field.'40  So, in 
the context of the Commerce Clause, at least according to Shreveport, the dual legal order 
explicitly provides for the supremacy of the transjurisdictional domain.  This rule is the subject 
of recurring controversy for proponents of state rights who argue that the federal power is 
secondary to the power of the states.  State rights supremacists assert that, since the states created 
the federal government in the first place for defined purposes, states maintain control over 
federal institutions. 
The power of the federal government extends not only to commerce, but also to matters 
affecting commerce.  In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held in this regard: 'The 
power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce 
among the states.  It extends to those activities interstate which so affect interstate commerce or 
the exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.'41  Just as recipients of 
international financial aid bemoan the conditions attached, so have various states resisted the 
ability of Congress to regulate matters that to them appear squarely within the domestic political 
domain.  For instance, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an 
Atlanta motel unlawfully discriminated against African-Americans.42  The motel objected to this 
federal intervention into its private commercial affairs.  The Court determined that, since the 
motel solicited guests from other states, its regulation was justified by the Commerce Clause.  
Further, the Court held that Congress could legislate against private discrimination because the 
Bill of Rights was applicable to actions falling under the reach of the Commerce Clause.  Thus, 
                                                
36 Id 4 
37 For a discussion of the contrasting approaches see e.g. J Tully Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of 
Diversity (Cambridge UP Cambridge 1995) 
38 Wik Peoples v. Queensland 1996, 187 CLR 1, 214 
39 Id 214 
40 Houston v. US (1914) 234 US 342, 351-352 
41 McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316, 421 
42 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. US (1964) 379 US 241 
10
Global Jurist Topics , Vol. 3 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 2
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/19 1:23 PM
engaging in transjurisdictional commercial activity makes a state subject to not only commercial 
rules, but also to matters deemed to affect the national interest.  
Transnational commercial actors often rely upon institutions and resources owned by 
members of the local political domain.  They use these institutions to expand the commercial 
domain.  By exercising control over another domain's property, the transnational actors incur the 
risk of reassertion of control by the legitimate owners.  When it is impossible to translate control 
into ownership, a modicum of vulnerability becomes unavoidable.  The uncertainties and risks 
inherent in this arrangement have led transnational commercial actors to seek insurance to 
mitigate the risk that local political actors will disrupt transnational commercial investments. 
Various international and national and also public and private institutions have responded 
to the need to mitigate risk by offering insurance to commercial actors against political risk.  
This insurance is particularly necessary when undertaking commercial activity in politically 
contested territories.  To meet this need, in 1988 the World Bank established the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).  The purpose of MIGA is 'to encourage the flow of 
investment for productive purposes among member countries and in particular developing 
member countries.'43  In line with the tenets of the dual legal order, according to the Articles of 
Incorporation, MIGA 'shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member.' 
MIGA has at its disposal a range of mechanisms and offers insurance for a variety of 
risks.  The Agency may: 
(a) issue guarantees, including coinsurance and reinsurance, against non-commercial risks in 
respect of investments in a member country which flow from other member countries; 
(b) carry out appropriate complementary activities to promote the flow of investments to and 
among developing countries; and 
(c) exercise such other incidental powers as shall be necessary or desirable in furtherance of 
its objective.44 
In line with its role as mitigator of risk arising from the domestic political domain, the Agency 
offers insurance against the following types of risk: 
(i) Currency Transfer -- Any introduction attributable to the host government of 
restrictions on the transfer outside of the host country of its currency into a freely 
usable currency or another currency acceptable to the holder of the guarantee, 
including a failure of the host government to act within a reasonable period of 
time on an application by such holder of such transfer; 
(ii) Expropriation or Similar Measures -- Any legislative action or administrative 
action or omission attributable to the host government which has the effect of 
depriving the holder of a guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substantial 
benefit from, his investment, with the exception of non-discriminatory measures 
of general application which governments normally take for the purpose of 
regulating economic activity in their territories; 
(iii) Breach of Contract  -- Any repudiation or breach by the host government of a 
contractor with the holder of a guarantee, when 
                                               
43 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); 11 October, 1985 [1989] UKTS 
47, Article 2, Paragraph 1 
44 Id Article 2(a)-(c) 
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(a) the holder of a guarantee does not have recourse to a judicial or abitral forum to 
determine the claim of repudiation or breach, or 
(b) a decision by such forum is not rendered within such reasonable period of time as 
shall be prescribed in the contracts of guarantee pursuant to the Agency's 
regulations, or 
(c) such a decision cannot be enforced; and 
(iv) War and Civil Disturbance  --  Any military action or civil disturbance in any 
territory of the host country to which this Convention shall be applicable as 
provided in Article 66.45 
Insurance companies decide whether to insure certain commercial projects on the basis of the 
perceived political stability of the host country.  Insurability is based upon a risk rating 
calculated by prominent private agencies such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's.46 
Given the range of dual legal orders manifest in time and place and their protean nature, it 
is impossible to provide a comprehensive exploration of the topic in the space allotted.  
However, in the following section the development of a specific form of transjurisdictional 
commercial domain, the free zone, is discussed.  Three types of free zone receives attention, the 
free port, EPZ and the science park. 
C. The Free Zone: A Form of Trans-Jurisdictional Commercial Domain 
At the start of the paper, we introduced a particular form of transnational commercial domain 
manifest on an island in the Straits archipelagos—the free zone.  There we discussed three 
incarnations of the island, as a free port, EPZ and most recently a science park.  Now we turn to 
discuss the concept of free zone more broadly, tracing its historical origins and more fully 
exploring the three forms, free port, EPZ and science park, introduced at the outset. 
1. Free Ports 
Throughout history sovereign governments have created transjurisdictional commercial domains 
within their political territories.  As governments expanded their reach extra-territorially, they 
often negotiated extra-territorial zones within foreign territories.  At times, these zones have been 
negotiated by corporations.  Both internal and extra-territorial zones were governed by 
regulatory regimes distinct from their surrounding political territories.  These zones were 
enclosed by law and, at times, physically by walls and fences.  Up until the mid-twentieth 
century, a specific type of zone, the free port, proliferated transnationally.   
a. In Time and Place 
Over the last four centuries, European oligarchic states have made extensive use of free ports, a 
legal enclave, in the creation of the transnational commercial order.  Free ports were generally 
fenced in territories near a seaport.  In a maritime-based order, goods and persons travelled via 
ships.  In the process of shipping a good from point A to point Z, a ship might stop at several 
                                                
45 Id Chapter III: Operations: Article 11, Covered Risks (i)-(iv) 
46 See J Barratt 'Financing Projects through the Capital Markets--A South East Asian Perspective' in F D Oditah The 
Future for the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects (Clarendon P Oxford 1996) 95, 101-103 
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points between the ports of origin and destination.  In order that shippers might avoid paying 
customs to the political sovereign in whose territory a ship stopped in transit, free ports were 
established. 
To ensure that goods would not leak into the rest of the country, free ports were typically 
literally fenced in.  Guards patrolled the periphery of the port.  Customs officials regulated 
access to and from the hived-off zone.  The use of the word 'free' indicated that the port was an 
extra-territorial domain, unencumbered by the customs laws of the country in whose political 
territory it resided.  However, the term 'free' is misleading.  As Dr. Richard S. Thoman indicates, 
it is 'free' and 'foreign territory' only with respect to the application of customs 
formalities within its boundaries.  Directly or indirectly, it is still within the 
jurisdiction of the customs authorities.  This is an extremely important point for. . 
. the extension of authority of customs officials into the free port tends to negate 
the basic assumption upon which the device is based--namely that goods within 
the free port are not subject to customs jurisdictions.47 
Thus, it is important to recognise that the enjoyment of freedoms by a privileged class within the 
port necessitated a regulatory regime. 
Freedom was possible also as a result of the legally-facilitated and regulated 
infrastructure within the zones.  The customs authority constructed offices, accommodations and 
warehouses to meet shippers' needs.  Traditionally, intra-port processing was limited.  For this 
reason, the government did not need to institute extensive training courses for port workers.  
Despite the bare-bones nature of many ports, they were a site of merchant trading.  So 
governments not only provided the infrastructure of the ports, but also regulated inter-merchant 
activities.48  It is within this context that the supposedly extra-legal character of lex mercatoria
must be placed.  The extensive role of governments in establishing the free port environment in 
which merchants developed rules to govern their commercial intercourse suggests that the extra-
legal theories are indeed romantic in character. 
Throughout history, governments have made extensive use of free ports.  The free port 
legal technique dates back to the ancient trade routes of Tyre and Carthage.  During the modern 
era, free ports have existed throughout Europe.  For instance, free ports may be found in Bremen, 
Copenhagen, Danzig, Hamburg and Kiel.  As Europeans have travelled outward, governments, 
sometimes through their merchant agents, have established free ports along their trade routes.  
Within the British empire of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, entire territories 
such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Penang were declared free ports.49  This section provides a 
thumbnail sketch of the development and circulation of free ports up until the nineteenth century 
and then from the nineteenth century to the 1930s. 
  
b. Pre-Nineteenth Century 
Governments established free ports domestically and internationally in the period leading up to 
the mid nineteenth century.  When political communities were welcoming of commerce, the 
                                                
47 RS Thoman Free Ports and Foreign-Trade Zones (Cornell Maritime P Cambridge, MA 1956) 7-8 
48 Id 
49 HG Grubel 'Free Economic Zones: Good or Bad?' (1984) Aussenwirtschaft 43, 44 
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ports generally proliferated.  However, as political communities grew wary of commercial 
interests, the use of the ports receded.  During this period, each of the major imperial powers 
created free ports, including the Greeks, Romans, English and Dutch. 
The ancient city-states of the eastern and southern Mediterranean Sea used free ports to 
coordinate and maintain their vast trade routes.  Carthage itself controlled over three hundred 
African cities and numerous Mediterranean islands.  These political jurisdictions were often 
surrounded by communities hostile to foreigners.  Thus, the free ports developed as a 
compromise device.  Their proximity to the sea limited the territorial boundaries in need of 
defence and capitalised on the maritime powers of the city-states.  Thus, '[t]rade was closely and 
jealously regulated, the principle measure being that of granting foreign merchants access only to 
stipulated ports and ruthlessly prohibiting them from all others.'50 
The Romans also made use of transshipment centres to expand their empire to Asia.51  
Ports were established in Alexandria and Antioch and also as along the Nile, Red Sea and Gulf 
of Oman.  The Roman free port on the island of Delos is often cited as the progenitor of the 
modern free port.  Delos was a customs-free territory that promoted trade among Asia Minor, 
Egypt, Greece, North Africa and Syria.52  At the farthest reaches of the empire, the Romans 
established enclave territories through capitulation of sovereign foreign rulers. 
The use of free ports subsided for a period after the collapse of the Roman Empire.  
During the Crusades, they regained prominence in international commerce.  These ports were 
used in earnest throughout the seventeenth century.  In the Mediterranean, on the way from 
Europe to the Far East, the town of Livorno in Tuscany was established as a free city. 
From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, free ports were formed in a number of 
cities.  In Europe, free ports were found in Ancona, Civita-Vecchia, Fiume, Genoa, Marseilles, 
Messina, Trieste and Villefranche.  The best known of these ports was Genoa.  Thoman explains 
how in Genoa '[b]y an ordinance liberalizing earlier special privileges, a definite free zone--
including some port facilities but excluding the residential quarters--was set aside and fenced 
during the early portion of the seventeenth century.  Within the zone were warehouses for storing 
non-liquidated goods of foreign origin.'53  Although free ports were used in colonial territories 
from the sixteenth century onward, it was not until the eighteenth century that they proliferated 
overseas.  The English and Dutch used free ports extensively in their overseas territories from the 
eighteenth to early nineteenth century.  For example, the English established by act of parliament 
thirty free ports in the West Indies from 1766 to 1822.54  Also, following the British victory in 
the Opium Wars, European powers established a series of free ports in China under the ‘unequal 
treaty system’. 
c. Mid-Nineteenth Century On 
The patterns of free port use change after the mid-nineteenth century.  Ports become less 
prevalent in Europe and more common in colonial holdings. 
                                                
50 Id 12 
51 International Labour Organisation and Centre on Transnational Corporations Economic and Social Effects of 
Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing Zones (International Labour Office Geneva 1988) 1 
52 DLU Jayawardena 'Free Trade Zones' (1983) J World Trade L 427 
53 Thoman 14.  See also X Chen 'The Evolution of Free Economic Zones and the Recent Development of Cross-
National Growth Zones' (1995) 19(4) Intl J Urban and Regional Research 593, 600 
54 Thoman 16 
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For instance, in France, prior to the French Revolution, free ports were used extensively.  
With the revolution, the free cities were severely damaged.  Napoleon attempted to revive their 
use in the early nineteenth century.  Local political communities were strongly opposed to the 
capitulation to commerce that they represented.  For this reason free ports never regained a 
foothold in France throughout the century.  Instead the French employed a milder network of 
bonded warehouses, allowing temporary transshipment of goods.  Although the use of free ports 
generally declined in Europe, they continued to be used in Northern Europe, particularly in 
Denmark and Germany. 
During the same period free ports proliferated in colonial and overseas territories.  The 
British and Spanish used free ports for transshipment, exchange of goods and ship chandlering.  
Free ports existed in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and South America. 
During the late nineteenth century and up until the Depression of the 1930s, free ports 
gained in popularity in Northern Europe.  The period from the end of the First World War until 
the 1930s saw the largest increase in their numbers on the Continent.  As in France, political 
transition in Germany in the late nineteenth century had significant impact upon the use of free 
ports.  With the creation of the Customs Union, the constituent states ceded their free port status 
to the centralising authority.  In the process of cession, states negotiated widely divergent terms 
with the Union. 
In the formation of the Customs Union, the free port statuses of Hamburg and Bremen 
were differently affected.  Of all the states, Hamburg was most successful in retaining the 
advantages it enjoyed under the pre-Union regime: 
Hamburg, upon entering the Customs Union, agreed to reduce the customs-free 
area from the entire city state to an isolated and fenced zone that encompassed all 
existing port facilities plus ground allotted for future port growth.  This zone, 
termed a 'free port' (Freihafen), was exempt from customs jurisdiction of the 
Union.  It enjoyed essentially unrestricted freedom of import, export, transition, 
warehousing, ships' provision, manipulating and sorting, etc. (if these last did not 
lead to advantage in liquidating customs regarding goods later imported into the 
Union), and even of manufacture (for re-export and transit purposes).  Intensive 
retail trade and private residences were prohibited with certain exceptions.  
Management of the zones was in the hands of Hamburg officials. 55 
In Europe, Hamburg was unique during this period in permitting the manufacturing of goods 
within its port.  In its agreement with the Customs Union, Hamburg received this privilege by 
refraining from competition with domestic industries and formed an entirely export oriented 
port.56  Cities such as Bremen were not as fortunate.  Initially, Bremen was refused free port 
status by the Customs Union.  With time, Bremen expanded its customs free territory and, in 
1902, was granted 'out-of-toll territory' status. 
Hamburg's ability to manufacture was unique and not shared by Bremen or other pre-
Second World War ports.  However, this manufacturing privilege became an important 
characteristic of a mid-twentieth century legal enclave, the EPZ. 
2. Export Processing Zones 
                                                
55 Id 18 
56 DLU Jayawardena 'Free Trade Zones' (1983) J World Trade L 427  
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After the War, free ports were often superceded by EPZs.  The inclusion of manufacturing within 
zones and the decolonisation movements both figured prominently in this shift.  An important 
continuity was the rhetoric of 'freedom' pervading the discussion of each enclave.  While the 
public assumption was that the enclaves were regulation-free offshore havens, in fact, they were 
heavily regulated.  The regulation favoured commercial interests. 
a. A New Form 
Unlike the free port, EZPs allow manufacturing.  The World Bank relates: 
The export processing zone (EPZ) is a relatively recent variant of the widely used 
free trade zone (FTZ) -- a designated area, usually in or next to a port area, to and 
from which unrestricted trade is permitted with the rest of the world.  
Merchandise may be moved in and out of FTZs free of customs, stored in 
warehouses for varying periods and repackaged as needed.  Goods imported from 
the FTZ into the host country pay the requisite duties; their storage in FTZ 
warehouses permits rapid delivery to order, meanwhile saving interest in customs 
payments. 
EPZs, more specifically, also provide building and services for 
manufacturing, i.e. transformation of imported raw materials into finished 
products, usually for export out but sometimes partially for domestic sale subject 
to the normal duty.  The EPZ is thus a specialized industrial estate located 
physically and/or administratively outside the customs barrier, oriented to export 
production.  Its facilities serve as a showcase to attract investors and a 
convenience for their getting established, and are usually associated with other 
initiatives.57 
However, this distinction between free ports and EPZs requires qualification.  For instance, 
Hamburg included manufacturing.  Also, during the 1950s industrial estates permitted 
manufacturing.58  While manufacturing was exceptional in free ports, in EPZs manufacturing is 
the norm. 
The EPZ is conceived as a territorially delimited jurisdiction governed by a distinct 
regulatory regime.  Often the EPZ is literally fenced in and typically ranges from ten to three 
hundred hectares in size.59  Like the free port, the borders of the zone are guarded.  Customs 
officials regulate the passage of goods in and out of the territory.  The boundaries are so sharply 
drawn, that the zones are often understood as a country within a country.  Some commentators 
                                                
57 Quoted in A Basile and DA Germidis Investing in Free Export Processing Zones (Development Centre of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Paris 1984) 20 
58 Industry Development Division, Industry and Energy Department and Trade Policy Division Country Economics 
Department Export Processing Zones (Policy, Research and External Affairs, The World Bank 20 The World Bank 
Washington, DC 1988) 24 
59 Id 7 
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have focused on their militaristic aspects, highlighting that zones may be surrounded by barbed 
wire fences, 'a new form of foreign settlement adapted to the new situation.'60 
Unlike free ports, EPZs include extensive infrastructure.  Because EPZs act as segments 
of a multi-chained manufacturing process, facilitative infrastructure is required.  In addition to 
factory buildings, the infrastructure might include communications lines, electricity, 
transportation, and waste disposal.  Often, as is the case in the electronics industry, the power 
and water needs are tremendous.  Also, various secondary services are required such as banks, 
hospitals, hotels, restaurants, and shipping agents.  Successful EPZs progress through at least two 
distinct phases: 
With a newly created EPZ, one of the critical economic problems is to fill up the 
vacant space as rapidly as possible so as to recoup the large infrastructural costs.  
With all the facilities already in place (water supply, electricity, telephones, 
access roads, etc.) and the factory buildings already constructed, or at least 
constructable at very short notice, investors can get their manufacturing 
operations off the ground in record time and occupy the territory very rapidly.  
Adding to this is the fact that one [sic] an EPZ has got off the ground, and proven 
itself a viable alternative for foreign investors, the word gets out very quickly in 
the international community concerned.  This is the second stage when the real 
take-off occurs.  Because of these sociological links between the main firms in 
any given industry, and because of this possibility of 'occupying the territory' 
within a very short time, investment will tend to take place in waves of rather 
homogenous nature.61 
Also, firms locating in EPZs require workers.62 
Low labour costs are a prime motivator for TNCs to base segments of their production 
processes in the zones.  Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs and Otto Kreye argue the proliferation 
of zones has created a 'world factory system'.63  This system arises out of a process of global 
restructuring.  Kathryn Ward explains: 'Global restructuring refers to the emergence of the global 
assembly line in which research and management are controlled by the core or developed 
countries while assembly line work is relegated to semiperiphery or periphery nations that 
occupy less privileged positions in the global economy.'64  Generally, the most labour intensive 
and least sophisticated segments of production processes are located in EPZs.  Advanced 
segments are maintained in fully-industrialised countries.  Wages are dramatically lower in 
developing countries and the factory operators generally provide all of the training and 
'disciplining' of the zone work force.  The majority of EPZ factory workers are women. 
                                                
60 T Takeo 'Introduction' in Free Trade Zones & Industrialization of Asia: Special Issue AMPO Q Rev (Pacific-Asia 
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61 International Labour Organisation and Centre on Transnational Corporations Economic and Social Effects of 
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64 KB Ward 'Introduction and Overview' in KB Ward, (ed), Women Workers and Global Restructuring (Cornell U 
Ithaca 1990) 1 
17
Likosky: Dual Legal Orders
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/25/19 1:23 PM
The relocation of segments of production processes to the zones is often characterised as 
a shifting of production from a regulated to an un-regulated environment.  In reality, the zones 
themselves are heavily regulated.  As with the free ports, the regulations simply favour a 
particular set of interests. 
b. Rhetoric and Reality 
According to most commentators, EPZs institute a liberal regulatory environment.65  The image 
is often of a partially deregulated space existing within a highly regulated environment.  Along 
these lines, Grubel highlights that activities take place within the EPZs 'without some of the 
government taxation and regulation that applies to them in the rest of the country.'66  Similarly, 
Jayawardena indicates that the zones have an 'extraterritorial status, which enables them to enjoy 
a de facto immunity from domestic civil laws and government controls.'67  So clear is this 
demarcation between the zone and the rest of the country that, according to Jayawardena, 'for all 
intents and purposes movement to and from free trade zones and domestic tariff areas (DTAs) 
constitute movements between two countries.'68  This picture of a free, liberalised and 
deregulated territory within a country is misleading.69 
The EPZ is a heavily regulated zone.70  Its autonomous character is the product of a sharp 
delineation of its regulatory boundaries.  Extra-zone domestic and foreign legislative actions play 
a role in constituting the zone.  International organisations and foreign governments promote 
EPZs through tariff and finance laws and the creation of arbitration tribunals.  The hosting state 
creates facilitative infrastructure and development corporations to lend support to foreign 
enterprises.    
c. Promotion 
The Shannon Free Trade Zone in Ireland is generally credited as reinvigorating the free port in 
the modern era.71  Faced with a declining economy and endowed with an airport, government 
officials in Shannon decided to promote the local economy as an offshore haven for 
manufacturing companies.  While the nineteenth century international economy had depended 
upon maritime travel, the Shannon Zone's airport allowed international connectivity through air 
travel.  Companies could ship in, upgrade, and ship out goods with little hassle.  This  
dissociating of the enclave from the seaport represented a major innovation on the free port. 
Success of the Shannon Zone spurred the international circulation of EPZs throughout the 
developing world.  The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) took the 
                                                
65 Industry Development Division, Industry and Energy Department and Trade Policy Division Country Economics 
Department Export Processing Zones (Policy, Research and External Affairs, The World Bank 20 The World Bank 
Washington, DC 1988) 7 
66 HG Grubel 'Free Economic Zones: Good or Bad?' (1990) 39 Aussenwirtschaft 43 
67 DLU Jayawardena 'Free Trade Zones' (1983) J World Trade L 427, 428 
68 Id 
69 See e.g. X Chen 'The Evolution of Free Economic Zones and the Recent Development of Cross-National Growth 
Zones' (1995) 19(4) Intl J Urban and Regional Research 593, 595-596 
70 See e.g. D Wall 'Export Processing Zones' (1976) 10 J World Trade L 478  
71 International Labour Organisation and Centre on Transnational Corporations Economic and Social Effects of 
Multinational Enterprises in Export Processing Zones (International Labour Office Geneva 1988) 1 ('The modern 
EPZ should rightly be considered as an Irish invention') 
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lead in promoting the EPZ technology.  Since its founding in 1967, UNIDO has offered 
assistance to countries seeking to establish EPZs.  To this end, UNIDO has issued reports and 
provided feasibility studies.  In its promotional activities, UNIDO has worked closely with the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the World Bank and the original creators 
of the Shannon Zone.  The Shannon Zone representatives were initially commissioned by 
UNIDO to write a 'how-to' report on starting an EPZ.  The United Nations Center on 
Transnational Corporations has also furnished technical assistance through its Advisory and 
Information Services Division.72  In addition, in 1976 various zone authorities with the help of 
UNIDO established the World Industrial Free Zone Association.73 
Governments of developing countries responded favourably to the promotion of the EPZ 
technology.  With de-colonisation, foreign governments no longer maintained the colonial free 
ports.  With the nationalisation of foreign property and based on a concerted strategy to develop 
internal economies of their own, many new states embarked on strategies of import substitution.  
The goal of import substitution was to reduce reliance on imports by fostering local industrial 
production processes.  To do so, nation-states instituted a customs regime which discouraged 
foreign imports through the imposition of tariffs.  The goal was to insulate nascent domestic 
industries from direct foreign competition.  Indigenous industries did not develop as planned and 
during the 1960s many countries began to shift towards a strategy of export-led growth.  To 
facilitate this shift, governments established EPZs.74 
Developing countries created EPZs to attract foreign TNCs to locate segments of their 
production processes within the zones.  For this reason, the zones are typically more integrated 
with foreign economies than the rest of the country.75  EPZs arose with the ascendancy of the 
new international division of labour.76  In the 1960s, European, Japanese, and US automobile, 
clothing, electronics, optics, plastics, sporting goods, textiles and toy manufacturers restructured 
their production processes.  These commodities are manufactured through assembly line 
production.  Thus, as long as transportation is quick and reliable, segments of production may be 
geographically dispersed.77  To evade high labour costs in industrialised countries and stringent 
environmental regulations, companies shipped production segments overseas.  Low labour costs 
and less stringent environmental regulations in developing countries allowed companies to offset 
shipping costs. 
Home governments of foreign TNCs play a role in legally-constituting EPZs.  As the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) notes: ' the opportunities 
offered to foreign enterprises to invest in developing countries are largely dependent upon tariff 
provisions in force in the investor's country of origin, more specifically when the proposed 
                                                
72 Id 3 
73 T Takeo 'Introduction' in Free Trade Zones & Industrialization of Asia: Special Issue AMPO Q Rev (Pacific-Asia 
Resource Center Tokyo 1977) 4 
74 International Labour Organisation and Centre on Transnational Corporations 53-54; FA Rabbani (ed) Economic 
and Social Impacts of Export Processing Zones (Asian Productivity Organization Japan 1983) 46 and K Hamada 
'An Economic Analysis of the Duty-Free Zone' (1974) 4 J Intl Economics 225, 226 
75 M Webber and Z Ying 'The Role of Export Processing Zones in Industrial Development' Working Paper 93-2
(Monash Melbourne Joint Project on Comparative Australian-Asian Development) 7 
76 F Frobel, J Heinrichs, and O Kreye The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in 
Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries (Cambridge UP Cambrdige 1980) 
77 See e.g. G Gereffi 'Capitalism, Development and Global Commodity Chains' in L Sklair, (ed), Capitalism and 
Development (Routledge New York 1994) 211; G Gereffi and M Korzeniewicz (edd) Commodity Chains and 
Global Capitalism (Praeger London 1994); F Snyder 'Governing Globalisation' in MB Likosky, (ed), Transnational 
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activity consists of assembly operations with a view to re-export to the country of origin.'78  For 
example, the US has promoted the internal restructuring and internationalisation of its 
companies' production processes through amendments to its tariff and finance laws. 
When a US company exports a partially finished good abroad and then re-imports the 
finished product, US tariff law determines the customs owing by the TNC to the government.  
According to Tariff Items 806.30 and 807.00, the customs inspector is charged with valuing the 
foreign value-added to the to-be-imported good.  The customs official calculates the value-added 
abroad and charge duties only on that portion of the product.  This calculation appears 
straightforward. 
However, in practice valuation is a discretionary exercise.  Customs officials typically 
defer to company valuations for efficiency reasons.79  When a customs official values an 
upgraded good, it is not always clear how to calculate sunk costs.  For instance, a company may 
ship an unfinished good overseas for further manufacturing.  While the upgrading may occur in 
an overseas factory, in the home state the company may undertake contemporaneous research 
and development influencing the processes by which the offshore good is upgraded.  A TNC 
may then adjust its internal balance sheet, either attributing the home state research and 
development to overseas production or treating it as a home state-produced good.  The same goes 
for market research, financial decision-making and product design conducted in the home state. 
Another way foreign governments contribute to EPZ growth is by legislating tariff breaks 
for less industrialised countries.  When certain developing countries export a good to the US 
market, this good is granted preferential status in the form of relief from paying duties.80  If a 
foreign company locates its production processes within a preferred status country, then the 
company finds itself the beneficiary of this inter-state income redistribution device.  When a 
TNC re-imports its processed good into its home state, the good is considered a preferred-status 
country product. 
Fully-industrialised governments amend laws to facilitate the financing of TNC 
operations in developing countries.  Typically the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
requires disclosure of information, which is often not readily available in developing countries.  
It is difficult for a company undertaking production in an EPZ to meet reporting requirements 
when borrowing money from capital markets.  To allow companies to borrow money in these 
circumstances, the SEC amended its reporting requirements.  Specifically, the SEC passed Rule 
144(A) to minimise requirements.81 
                                                
78 A Basile and DA Germidis Investing in Free Export Processing Zones (Development Centre of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development Paris 1984) 18 
79 The focus in US law has shifted towards 'informal compliance' and 'reasonable care'.  LA Glick Guide to United 
States Customs and Trade Laws after the Customs Modernization Act (Second edn Kluwer International London 
1997) 2.  See also Id 37-44 
80 Under the Lome Convention the European Union grants a similar set of tariff breaks to poor countries.  On this 
Convention see N Kofele-Kale 'Title V of the 2nd Lome Convention Between the EEC and ACP States: A Critical 
Assessment of the Industrial Cooperation Regime as it Relates to Africa' (1983) 5 J Intl Business 352; WW Leirer 
'Rules of Origin Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the ACP-EEC Lome IV Convention and their 
Compatibility with the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement of Rules of Origin' (1995) 16 U Pennsylvania J Intl 
Business L 483; and IK Minta 'The Lome Convention and the New International Economic Order' (1984) 27 
Howard LJ 953 
81 V Kokkalenios 'Note: Increasing United States Investment in Foreign Securities: An Evaluation of SEC Rule 
144A' (1992) 60 Fordham L Rev 179; C Rovinescu and G Thieffry 'Cross-Border Marketing' in F Oditah, (ed), The 
Future for the Global Securities Market: Legal and Regulatory Aspects (Clarendon P Oxford 1996) 31, 51-57; KY 
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Businesses locating in EPZs have infrastructure needs beyond simply factories to store or 
add value to goods.  The OECD notes: 
legal guarantees become pointless if the foreign investor has misgivings about the 
host country's economic system.  The concern here is not so much the risk of 
nationalisation, expropriation or exchange controls as the need for assurance that 
the backdrop services essential to the enterprises are efficient. 
Such services including banking, sea transport, consultancy, legal and 
accounting services, telecommunications, etc., none of which can be improvised 
and all of which presuppose a certain business tradition which is not easy to find 
in countries where State control is highly developed, irrespective of the efforts 
made by the governments of such countries.82 
Governments produce facilitative infrastructure through extra-enclave legal reforms.  The OECD 
does not acknowledge that a trustworthy national investment climate depends upon the 
willingness of that oligarchic state to use its domestic legal order to cater to foreign businesses.  
Catering to foreign business needs often requires a strong and proactive state. 
In the 1980s countries built much of the EPZ infrastructure through a transnational wave 
of privatisation programmes.  Privatisation occurred contemporaneous to the process of 
globalisation.  As fully-industrialised countries privatised strategic industries, the resultant 
companies transnationalised, selling their products overseas.  These industries included 
telecommunications and transportation.  When developing countries privatised they opened 
themselves up to foreign TNCs.  In partnership with developing country TNCs, governments and 
private industries in developing countries built the facilitative infrastructure for the EPZs.   
Given the competition among developing countries for foreign TNCs, as TNCs require 
more sophisticated labour pools, countries revamp their educational systems to meet demands.  
Since education in developing countries is typically provided by the state, the upgrading requires 
active intervention by governments in the extra-zonal sector of the economy.  Intervention 
includes amending education laws, reorganising ministerial departments and hiring foreign 
university consultants to remodel colleges and universities. 
Governments create administrative agencies to oversee EPZ development.  These 
agencies promote EPZs internationally, catering to the needs of foreign TNCs and suggest 
amendments to legislation to make the domestic environment more appealing to TNCs.  These 
development corporations serve a dual function, promoting foreign investment and ensuring that 
such investment also advances domestic development goals.83  With reference to EPZs, the 
OECD speaks about how the dual goals interact: 
The increasing interest by many developing countries in policies to attract export-
oriented investment, which is expected to produce foreign outlets, create jobs, 
transfer technology, and know-how, generate inflow of foreign exchange, etc., 
                                                                                                                                                            
Testy 'Note: Capital Markets in Transition: A Response to New SEC Rule 144A' (1990) 66 Indiana L J 233; and S 
Wolff 'Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation' (1995) 23 Denver J Intl L and Policy 347 
82 A Basile and DA Germidis Investing in Free Export Processing Zones (Development Centre of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development Paris 1984) 32 
83 See CHIII(D) 
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and on the other hand, to promote a whole process of specifically national 
industrialisation in a protected domestic market.  It contains an inherent basic 
contradiction, insofar as the host country, in dissociating the domestic market 
from the export market, is not certain to obtain from the foreign investment which 
it could legitimately expect.84 
Development strategies certainly associate themselves with the domestic market.  The drawing 
of labour from the extra-zone territory to a serve foreign company needs is the prime example.  
However, in contradistinction to the OECD position, association is selective and structurally 
advantages foreign companies over domestic actors.  Development companies privilege the 
needs of foreign companies.  Thus dissociation from the domestic market is partial and selective. 
TNCs are often wary of subjecting themselves to host state courts and often demand that 
their business disputes be resolved by arbitration tribunals.  The channelling of EPZ disputes into 
arbitration tribunals further distinguishes the transnational commercial domain from the local 
political domain of dual legal orders.  Parties to an international arbitration often choose the laws 
of a third party state to govern the resolution of their disputes.  The choice of a specific state does 
sometimes mean that the arbitration tribunal will be located in the state whose law governs the 
transaction.85  Many countries prefer to have disputes heard in their own countries and develop 
laws geared to international business concerns.86 
In sum, despite its enclave reputation, the EPZ is in fact reliant upon domestic and 
international forces.  Whilst the EPZ benefits from the sovereignty of the host government, 
companies opt out of sovereign responsibilities.  High technology companies also participate in 
the zones.  Governments compete for these companies, believing that the future of the world 
economy lies in information technology.  To this end, governments use EPZs and a later 
generation enclave, the science park, to attract high technology TNCs.  Manuel Castells and 
Peter Hall adopt the French term for science parks; technopoles; and provide the following 
definition: 
Generally, technopoles are planned developments.  Some are pure private sector 
real-estate investments, and these happen to be among the most numerous but 
least interesting.  A significant number, however, have resulted from various 
kinds of cooperation and partnership between the public and private sectors.  
They are promoted by central or regional or local governments, often in 
association with universities, together with private companies that occupy the 
resulting spaces.  And these technopoles, the most interesting ones, are invariably 
more than just plots to rent.  They also contain significant institutions of a quasi-
public or nonprofit type, such as universities or research institutes, which are 
specifically implanted there in order to help in the generation of new information.  
For this is the function of the technopole:  it is to generate the basic materials for 
the informational economy.87 
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85 See e.g. G Bernini 'Foreign Investment and Arbitration in the Frame of Globalization of World Economy' (1997) 4 
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Science parks have proliferated around the globe.  Parks exist in Germany, France, Japan, 
Malaysia, Russia, Taiwan, Texas and the UK, among other places.  Recipes for 'home growing' a 
'Silicon Valley' travel in the briefcases of consultants. 
3. High Technology Zones 
Almost since inception, the high technology economy has been transnationally-constituted.  
Japanese and US companies dominate the high technology economy.88  Companies locate 
production processes throughout the world.  Governments tailor EPZs and science parks to meet 
high technology companies' needs. 
a. US/Japanese Duopoly 
Japan and the US dominate the transnational high technology economy, although European 
companies have recently increased their market share.  At the outset, the US companies took an 
early lead.  However, intense competition from Japanese semi-conductor companies forced a 
more cooperative relationship between industries of the two countries.  In 1986, Japan and the 
US signed a bilateral agreement governing semiconductor production.89  Recently this duopoly 
has shown signs of weakening.90  The success of both the US and Japanese high technology 
economies has depended upon the extensive intermingling of oligarchic states and corporations. 
US science parks developed with government subsidy.  For instance, when in the 1950s 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 were established, they depended upon the military contracts.  Also, 
the internet itself was a government funded endeavour.91  Although popular representations of 
the high technology economy focus on its private nature, as Ernst and O'Connor relate: 
It is important to note that developments in computer architecture as much as in 
software design and in the miniaturisation of electronic components would have 
been inconceivable without heavy US government expenditures, first on military 
and later on also on space programmes.  The heavy government involvement in 
funding computer research in the early years of development helped to spread the 
basic ideas about digital computers to a great variety of research laboratories, thus 
turning much of this knowledge into a quasi-public good.  The same applies to the 
major innovations in semiconductor technology where, without exception, 
military funds have been involved.  In addition, anti-trust suits against AT&T and 
IBM forced both industry leaders to adopt quite open and liberal attitudes towards 
the diffusion of crucial patents and production know-how to other firms.92 
Stories of garage entrepreneurs dominate popular representations.  These narratives downplay 
the role of government subsidies for universities and lucrative government contracts with 
                                                
88 D Ernst and D O'Connor Competing in the Electronics Industry: The Experience of Newly Industrialising 
Economies (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Paris 1992) 53-69 
89 Id 41 
90 Id 54-60 
91 HH Perritt, Jr. Law and the Information Superhighway: Privacy, Access, Intellectual Property, Commerce, 
Liability (Wiley Law Publications New York 1996) 
92 Ernst and O'Connor 61 
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businesses in nurturing the high technology economy.  Government money allowed companies 
and universities to develop high technology products insulated from the disciplining forces of the 
market.  As Ernst and O'Connor note:  
A very active industrial policy was required, both to promote the emergence of 
semiconductor merchant firms and to break the inertia and technological 
conservatism of the market leaders.  This is an important point to stress which 
conventional wisdom tends to neglect:  in the United States as much as in Japan, 
industrial policy has played a central role in the development of the electronics 
industry.93 
Further, governments imposed information sharing requirements on companies, permitting the 
circulation of intellectual property, which would otherwise have been protected as private 
company property under law. 
Although, the government was involved at the early stages of the high technology 
industry, over time, defence contracts dried up and companies commercialised publicly-financed 
goods.  Many commentators assume that Silicon Valley is presently a government-free capitalist 
enclave.  Private entrepreneurs compete for private financing of the next innovative idea.  
However, the government has not left the scene.  For instance, the federal government works 
closely with industry, developing regulatory structures tailored to its fast paced production 
process. Intel has negotiated with the government a self-regulatory approach to its environmental 
compliance.94 
Japan has undertaken a comprehensive plan to make the country a leading figure in 
information technology by establishing nineteen science parks.  To do so, the government 
mobilised all sectors of the society in the service of the plan.  As Laffitte indicates: 
This plan and its accompanying fiscal measures involve every Ministry and all 
prefectures with Technopolis sites.  All resources are mobilized including the 
media, industry and local authorities.  Television, radio and local newspapers lend 
significant and permanent support to the actions taken by the prefectures, while 
their role in supplying the public with information as an opportunity for ongoing 
dialogue has made people aware that a new industrial era, featuring the synergetic 
interplay of education, research and industry, is now dawning.95 
While the development of the US high technology industries was rooted in defence industry 
applications, in Japan development was commercially driven.96   
Japanese companies have dispersed their production processes throughout East Asia 
where they dominate the semi-conductor market.97  Offshoring has reduced costs by capitalising 
on comparatively low wages.  Also, Japanese companies have circumvented quotas on the 
importation of Japanese semiconductor products by the US.  To do so, Japanese companies 
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export partially finished goods to Southeast Asian states.  Then, the goods are directly shipped to 
the US from these states rather than to the quota-ridden Japan.  In this way, Japanese firms also 
benefit from the tariff-based income redistribution device elaborated earlier in the paper.98  
Effectively, customs restrictions are circumvented as finished goods are identified as products of 
non-Japanese countries when they arrive in the US.99 
b. Transnationality 
Since the 1960s, high technology firms have located segments of their production processes in 
overseas factories.  Most of these factories have been located in EPZs.  TNCs have invested 
primarily in Southeast Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan.100  Other preferred sites include Brazil and China.  Typically, companies transfer 
low-end labour intensive segments of their production processes overseas.  Higher value added 
segments generally remain at their headquarters.101 
The outsourcing has been effectuated through various legal techniques.  For example, 
companies have established joint ventures, located wholly owned subsidiaries in the EPZs and 
entered into contractual relationships.  Another very popular means of legally structuring the 
relationships between companies and their East Asian suppliers is through original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) agreements.  Henderson describes these agreements: 
Under such an arrangement the purchaser supplies the designs, many of the 
components, oversees production quality and markets their own brand names.  
The OEM tends merely to assemble the final product.  The benefits to the 
purchaser lie largely in the cost reductions (both labour costs and over-heads) 
while for the OEM they lie in the relatively easy and cheap access to overseas 
markets and in theory represent a useful conduit for technology transfer.102 
Agreements are typically justified on the basis of their ability to effectuate technology transfer. 
Companies have also shifted production overseas to opt out of environmental regulations 
in their home countries.  The high technology industry is generally put forth as a cleaner industry 
than its predecessors.  However, many segments of the high technology economy are 
environmentally-damaging.  For example, the largest cluster of Environmental Protection 
Agency superfund sites are located in Silicon Valley.103  The negative environmental impact of 
high technology has been brought to the public's attention by local environmental groups.  In 
response to environmental campaigns and government intervention, Silicon Valley firms have 
cleaned up their act locally.  One way they have improved their domestic environmental record is 
by shifting the most environmentally damaging segments of their production processes overseas 
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99 J Henderson 'Electronics Industries and the Developing World: Uneven Contributions and Uncertain Prospects' in 
L Sklair, (ed), Capitalism and Development (Routledge New York 1994) 258, 265 
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or to other regions in the country.  Many polluting chip fabrication plants have been transferred 
to Southeast Asia or the US Southwest. 
For certain countries, offshoring has created an opportunity for economic development.  
In the mid to late 1980s, several countries began to move up on the high technology value chain.  
Notably, Hong Kong and Singapore shifted away from labour intensive production and towards 
circuit design, computer controlled testing operations and wafer fabrication.  As these countries 
upgraded, a regional division of labour in Southeast Asia emerged.  Not only did other countries 
shoulder a greater number of labour intensive production needs, but Hong Kong and Singapore 
began to outsource their own low end high technology labour needs to countries such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.104 
c. Promoting Science Parks 
Although most discussions of science parks focus on their comparative aspects, the global 
phenomenon of science park proliferation must be understood transnationally.  When a 
government hires a consultant to advise it on developing a science park, the consultant often acts 
as an intermediary.  The consultant provides a basic recipe for success to its government client.  
This recipe comprises tried and tested ingredients from other science parks.  At the same time, 
recipes must include local ingredients.  Importantly, governments also go to consultancy firms 
for information on current trends in the high technology industry. 
Consultants typically work for high technology TNCs in the most advanced sectors of the 
information economy and thus possess privileged knowledge of their leading companies' 
business needs.  When a government hires a consultancy, it purchases this knowledge.  Often the 
government client also purchases from the consultancy a business connection with specific 
foreign firms.  So a government might design a science park to cater to the needs of specific 
TNCs or clusters of them.   
Through EPZs, countries actively pursue the dual goals of catering to high technology 
TNCs and also to moving up on the international value chain.  While the EPZ provides low end 
labour, upgrading generally accompanies the development of science parks, which aim to solve a 
problem faced by countries pursuing development through EPZs.  United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development relates: 
technically sophisticated production processes are not normally to be found in 
EPZs.  The pre-assembly stages which may require advanced technology remain 
located in industrialized countries.  For instance, in semi-conductor 
manufacturing, the two high technology processes, mask-making and wafer 
fabrication, are undertaken in developed home countries.  Hence, the EPZs have 
not offered developing countries access to modern product or process technology.  
Moreover, foreign investors, in particular transnational corporations, centralize 
research and development activities of their production sites in developed 
countries.105 
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Science parks are conscious attempts to break into higher value-producing aspects of high 
technology production.  J. A. Schumpeter posits a theory of creative destruction, whereby new 
products drive an older generation of productions out of the market.106  In the case of EPZs and 
science parks the old technology, the EPZ, does not disappear.  Instead the EPZ maintains itself 
as a distinct entity, while contributing to the growth of science parks.  Alternatively, the EPZ is 
incorporated into the science park.  Similarly, as the 'new' infrastructure, eg telecommunications, 
of the high technology economy is laid, the old infrastructures increase in importance.  The 
goods promised over telecommunications lines must often be delivered over roads, through air 
transport or by train.   
Labour markets also pose a challenge to Schumpeter's theory.  Many argue that the 
science parks drive a shift in domestic labour markets towards a more skilled population base.  
The average income of a country expands with a successful science park.  The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) argues: 
Export processing zones were created in order to generate new employment 
opportunities and foster exports of manufacturing goods, and the growth of 
employment and exports, was assumed, rightly or wrongly, to contribute to the 
host country's development.  What was apparently largely overlooked is that a 
country's success on the development front--success being measured here, for 
want of a better indicator, on the basis of the rise in average per capita income, 
would ultimately undermine the very foundations of an EPZ industrialisation 
strategy based on low labour costs.107 
However, the ILO does not acknowledge the contemporaneous existence of EPZs and science 
parks.  The worker base of EPZs is generally female, while the science park is promoted as 
providing a more trained and male workforce.  So, the coexistence of EPZs and science parks is 
not inherently contradictory. 
As discussed above, since their beginning, Silicon Valley and Japanese firms have relied 
upon EPZs abroad to outsource much of their low end semiconductor production.  As metropoles 
transform themselves into almost entirely high end and high value producing regions, firms cede 
other elements of their production processes to overseas competitors.  Cession is in part the result 
of the ability of overseas governments and their firms to offer foreign companies not just factory 
labour.  Through industrial strategies, developing countries have begun to establish themselves 
as niche suppliers for certain types of high technology goods. 
Science parks are often designed as leapfrogging mechanisms.  Unlike the primarily 
factory-based EPZs, the infrastructure of science parks is far more ambitious.  Since the goal of 
the science park is to move up on the international value chain, governments have either built 
new universities or refashioned old ones to produce a greater number of engineers.  Also, 
governments amend banking laws to encourage venture capital funding.  In addition, science 
parks are typically much larger geographical undertakings and required significant amendment to 
land laws.  F. M. Eul relates: 'While the property or real estate element may be of secondary 
importance in a successful innovation centre, it could well be that debt charges arising from 
capitalising of the building may be as great, if not greater than the cost of management and 
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107 International Labour Organisation and Centre on Transnational Corporations Economic and Social Effects of 
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operation of the innovation centre itself.'108  As well, the infrastructure of science parks is often 
funded by insurance companies, investment banks and pension funds.  Further, as the Japanese 
projects demonstrate, governments mobilise multiple sectors of the economy to advance their 
science park objectives. 
This broad-based mobilisation of society and focus on extensive infrastructure provision sets 
the science park apart from the EPZ.  While science parks remain geographically isolated, for 
success, they depend upon intervention in the extra-park zone.  In fact, the science park 
represents the partial de-enclaving of the EPZ.  The success of a science park requires mobilising 
an entire country or region to view high technology as the national priority and to make 
sacrifices accordingly.  For this reason, it is import to focus on the linkages between the science 
park and its surrounding environment, both domestically and internationally.  The OECD refers 
to these processes as 'disenclavement' and remarks '[t]he enclave nature of FEPZs has been 
stressed at length in all the economic literature on the subject, though without the actual 
possibility of "economic" as opposed to "institutional" or "legal" disenclavement having been 
examined, at least systematically.'109 
To speak of disenclavement is to address the relationship between the free zone and the local 
political domain.  As we have seen, the nature of this relationship has been the subject of 
recurring controversy throughout the history of free zones in their various manifestations as free 
ports, free cities, EPZs and science parks. 
D.  Conclusion 
We began this chapter by discussing the genesis of a free zone on a small island in the Straits 
archipelagos, tracing its development from a free port to an EPZ and most recently to a science 
park.  Throughout its life as a free zone, this island has comprised a transnational commercial 
domain of a dual legal order. 
A dual legal order comprises two domains, a transjuridictional commercial and local 
political.  Here we focused on a particular type of transjurisdictional commercial domain—the 
free zone.  Three historical forms of zone received attention, the free port, EPZ and the science 
park.  Various manifestations geographically and temporally were elaborated.  A number of 
observations may now be made concerning dual legal orders and free zones. 
First, despite similarities across time and place, zones are distinguishable on a number of 
grounds.  Parties involved in specific zones vary tremendously.  For instance, when Prince 
William Island first came into being, the United States was not yet in existence.  So, as the 
United States holds a dominant position in science parks in many parts of the world, one can 
immediately distinguish between the zones on the basis of those actors involved in them.  This is 
also true when comparing zones in East Asia to zones in Central Europe.   
Second, the transnational structures of power have shifted in composition throughout the 
life of the free zone.  European powers no longer dominate the transnational order.  As indicated, 
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the United States wields tremendous political power.  However, it is a relative newcomer.  At the 
same time, certain zones may be dominated by European and others by Japanese companies. 
Third, power relationships among participants within zones vary widely.  For instance, 
the labour standards in a zone in California may be higher than those  in Malaysia.  Also, a 
factory worker occupies a very different position in the structures of power within a zone than 
does a foreign corporate executive. 
Fourth, the proactive role of governments in each form of free zone calls into question the 
empirical basis of claims that the transnational commercial order is inherently extra-legal or a 
‘global law without a state’110.  Instead, we see a strong public law basis to this transnational 
order. 
Finally, as was stressed in the discussion of the dual legal order concept, a transnational 
commercial domain is established at a particular historical point.  Further, once established, it 
must be maintained.  We also saw how historically transjurisdictional commercial domains have 
been subject to challenges from the local political domains.  For instance, we saw how free cities 
were overtaken by local political communities in nineteenth century France.  Also, in the wake 
of decolonisation, local political domains established new states, which in turn expropriated the 
property of transnational commercial domains. 
Today, in many parts of the world, we are witnessing demands made upon transnational 
commercial domains of various dual legal orders.  For instance, protests in the United States led 
Nike to change its policies regarding the labour practices in EPZs in developing countries in 
which the company has factories.  Also, when Malaysia set up a science park to cater to 
Hollywood production companies, studios sought to take advantage of comparatively low worker 
wages.  Studios thus opted out of unionised California.  However, the presence of these studios 
in Malaysia led workers in the country to expect and subsequently demand ‘western’ wages for 
their work on a particular film.  These Malaysian workers, thinking that the same wages for the 
same work should be paid everywhere, demanded higher wages for film work.  In response, the 
government squelched protests to enure a business-friendly science park.   
This then leads us to ask what will become of the present-day free zones.  Will they be 
publicised by the local political domains?  Will local political domains in various parts of the 
world coordinate their efforts and overtake several transnational commercial domains 
collectively?  Will science parks deliver on their high technology promises of liberty and 
equality, peacefully expanding their reach into local political domains?  Regardless of the 
answers to these questions, the boundaries between domains of dual legal orders are contested.  
They are sites of negotiation in the context of transnational power disparities. 
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